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ROBINSON V. DEAN WITER
REYNOLDS, INC.: SEARCHING FOR THE
BASIS OF AN IMPLIED CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER SEC RULE 1OB-16
Margin trading is a method of stock acquisition that allows
investors to buy securities by paying a portion of the purchase
price, and obtaining a loan for the remaining amount." Brokers ex-
tending credit in margin transactions are required to disclose the
terms of the credit agreement under Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-16.2 The SEC promulgated Rule lOb-
16 in response to a congressional enactment that exempted securi-
ties margin transactions from the disclosure requirements of the
I See L. ENGEL & B. BOYD, HOW TO BUY STOCKS 174-81 (7th ed. 1982); B. STARK, SPE-
CIAL SITUATION INVESTING: HEDGING, ARBITRATION AND LIQUIDATION 36-39 (1983). The term
margin refers to the portion of the price that an investor contributes toward the purchase of
a security. B. STARK, supra, at 36. The remaining amount is typically advanced to the inves-
tor by his broker or extended by a financial institution. See L. ENGEL & B. BOYD, supra, at
175-76. Interest is charged on the credit extended. B. STARK, supra, at 36-37. To secure its
loan, the broker retains the securities in the street name of the brokerage firm as collateral.
Id. at 37. If the value of the securities subsequently declines, thereby devaluing the broker's
collateral, the broker may request additional margin (margin call). Id.; L. ENGEL & B. BOYD,
supra, at 177. If a margin call is not met within a specified period, the broker may cancel
the loan and sell the securities to affect repayment. Id. B. STARK, supra, at 37. This Com-
ment will consider only margin transactions in a long account. See generally RL AUSTER,
OPTION WRITING AND HEDGING STRATEGIES 7-15 (1975) (differentiating use of margin in long
and short positions).
2 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1985). The rule provides in pertinent part-
(a) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to extend credit, directly or
indirectly, to any customer in connection with any securities transaction unless
such broker or dealer has established procedures to assure that each customer:
(1) Is given or sent at the time of opening the account, a written statement or
statements disclosing (i) the conditions under which an interest charge will be
imposed; (ii) the annual rate or rates of interest that can be imposed; (iii) the
method of computing interest; (iv) if rates of interest are subject to change with-
out prior notice, the specific conditions under which they can be changed; (v) the
method of determining the debit balance or balances on which interest is to be
charged and whether credit is to be given for credit balances in cash accounts; (vi)
what other charges resulting from the extension of credit, if any, will be made and
under what conditions; and (vii) the nature of any interest or lien retained by the
broker or dealer in the security or other property held as collateral and the condi-
tions under which additional collateral can be required ....
Id. (emphasis added).
1986] SEC RULE 1OB-16
Truth In Lending Act (TILA).3 While a private right of action is
explicitly granted for violations of the TILA provisions,' Rule lOb-
16 does not expressly provide such a remedy.5 Federal courts, adju-
dicating margin investors' actions against brokers who have vio-
lated the disclosure requirements of Rule lOb-16, have produced
inconsistent holdings.6 Recently, in Robertson v. Dean Witter
3 See Consumer Credit Protection Act § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 1603(2) (1982); H.R. REP. No.
1040, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1967), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1962,
1986 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]; S. REP. No. 392, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1967) [herein-
after cited as S. REP.].
At the time the TILA was enacted, Congress already had empowered the Federal Re-
serve Board (FRB) to "prescribe rules and regulations with respect to the amount of credit
that may be initially extended and subsequently maintained on any security (other than an
exempted security)." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7a, 15 U.S.C. § 78g(a) (1982). Al-
though the FRB has been given the power to regulate the initial margin requirement (per-
centage of total purchase price investor must initially contribute), B. STARK, supra note 1, at
38, and the margin maintenance requirement (percentage of stock's current value that must
be maintained in account), id. at 38-39, it has chosen to regulate only the initial margin
requirement. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.1-220.130 (1986); Note, Civil Lidbility of a Broker for
Failure to Enforce Margin Requirements, 10 WILLAMErrTE L.J. 72, 73 (1973). Margin mainte-
nance requirements are established by the rules of individual stock exchanges or brokers. L.
ENGEL & B. BoYD, supra note 1, at 177; 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1250-51 (2d ed.
1961); 5 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3266 (2d ed. 1961 & Supp. 1969).
The FRB's initial margin requirement has fluctuated from as low as 40% (1937-1945) to
as high as 100% (Jan. 1946-Feb. 1947), L. ENGEL & B. BOYD, supra note 1, at 175; 2 L. Loss,
supra, at 1244-48; 5 L. Loss, supra, at 3262-64, and is presently at 50% of the current
market value for most securities. 12 C.F.R. § 220.18(a) (1986). The margin maintenance
requirement imposed by the New York Stock Exchange is 25% of the market value of the
securities held long. N.Y.S.E. Rule 431(b)(1). Many brokers impose a 30% minimum margin
maintenance requirement on both long and short positions. R. AUSTER, supra note 1, at 12.
4 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1982). The TILA states, in pertinent part:
[A]ny creditor who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this part...
with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum of -
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of the failure; ...
Id. The TILA also provides for criminal liability for willful and knowing violations of the
statute. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1982).
- 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1985); see supra note 2.
6 Compare Abeles v. Oppenheimer & Co., 597 F. Supp. 532, 535 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (recog-
nizing an implied cause of action under Rule 10b-16) with Furer v. Paine, Weber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,701 at 93,495 (C.D. Cal.
1982) (denying implied cause of action when Rule 10b-16). Five district courts have recog-
nized an implied private cause of action under Rule 10b-16. See Granville Mkt. Letter, Inc.
v. Oppenheimer & Co., 610 F. Supp. 922, 922 (S.D. Fla. 1985); Slomiak v. Bear Stearns &
Co., 597 F. Supp. 676, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Abeles, 597 F. Supp. at 536; Angelastro v. Pru-
dential-Bache Sec., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 270, 274 (D.N.J. 1983); Haynes v. Anderson & Strud-
wick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1321 (E.D. Va. 1981). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit has suggested that an implied private right of action exists under Rule
10b-16. See Liang v. Dean Witter & Co., 540 F.2d 1107, 1113 & n.25 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The
Courts of Appeals for the Second and Eleventh Circuits have declined to rule on the ques-
tion, since the plaintiffs before the courts failed to establish violations of Rule 10b-16. See
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:372
Reynolds, Inc., 7 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recog-
nized an implied private cause of action for violations of Rule lOb-
16 and required proof of scienter as a prerequisite to recovery of
damages.'
In Robertson, the plaintiff-investor (Robertson) purchased
treasury bonds on margin 9 through his broker Dean Witter Reyn-
olds, Inc. (Dean Witter). 10 As interest rates rose, the value of the
bonds, which represented the collateral for Dean Witter's loan,
fell. 1 To secure its loan, Dean Witter made several requests for
additional collateral over a period of seven months. 2 When Rob-
ertson failed to meet these margin calls, Dean Witter sold the
bonds to satisfy its outstanding loan, and Robertson suffered a
substantial loss.' 3 Claiming that his loss was caused by Dean Wit-
ter's failure to disclose the conditions on which credit was ex-
tended to him, 4 Robertson brought suit alleging violations of sec-
Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.,
763 F.2d 1352, 1358 (11th Cir. 1985). Three district courts have failed to reach a conclusion
for the same reason. See Nick v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 15, 18 & n.3
(D. Minn. 1984); Steinberg v. Sherson Hayden Stone, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 699, 700 (D. Del.
1982); Stephens v. Reynolds Secs., Inc., 413 F. Supp. 50, 52 (N.D. Ala. 1976). One district
court has found that an implied private cause of action does not exist under Rule 10b-16.
See Furer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. 98,701, at 93,495 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
749 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 534, 539-41.
9 Id. at 533; see supra note 1.
10 Robertson, 749 F.2d at 532-33. In Robertson, the plaintiff (Robertson) opened a bro-
kerage account on Aug. 15, 1980. Id. On Jan. 22, 1981, Robertson purchased margin treasury
bonds with a face value of $500,000 for $367,138 by paying $36,714 down. Id. at 533. The
treasury bonds in question were substantially discounted from their face value because in-
terest rates had risen since their issuance. Id.
Id. at 533; see supra note 1.
Robertson, 749 F.2d at 533; see supra note 1.
13 Robertson, 749 F.2d at 533. Robertson incurred a loss exceeding $149,000, including
his $36,714 down payment, $76,753 paid in interest charges to Dean Witter, and $36,000
paid to reduce the principal of his debt. Id.
11 Id. at 533. The Robertson court tacitly accepted the allegation that the failure of
Dean Witter to disclose credit information caused the loss of Robertson's investment in the
bonds. See id. at 533-41. In securities cases where the defendant has an obligation to dis-
close information but fails to do so, the causal connection between nondisclosure and the
injury can be established by showing that the information withheld was material. See Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). A fact is material when a
reasonable investor would have considered it important in deciding whether to invest. See
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 446-49 (1976). By violating the specific
disclosure requirements of Rule 10b-16, Dean Witter withheld information that Congress
and the SEC determined investors needed to know to intelligently select a broker for a
credit transaction. See SEC Release No. 34-8773 (December 16, 1969), 34 Fed. Reg. 19,717,
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tion 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)15
and SEC Rule lOb-16.'0 The district court dismissed the suit for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 7 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed.'
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Nelson employed a two-
step analysis' determining first that the SEC was congressionally
authorized to establish rules implying a private cause of action
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,20 and that Rule 10b-16
was drafted such that the private right of action in section 10(b)
could legitimately be implied into the Rule.2 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Robertson's argument that the
necessary congressional intent for an implied right of action is in
the TILA, and held that the proper source of statutory authority is
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.22 The court declared that the
existence of an implied cause of action under section 10(b) is "well-
established"2 3 and that Congress gave the SEC broad authority to
promulgate rules pursuant to section 10(b). 4 The court reasoned
19,717 (1969) [hereinafter cited as SEC Release]. Therefore, mere violation of the specific
disclosure requirements of Rule 10b-16 is sufficient to establish materiality and thereby cau-
sation. See Slomiak v. Bear Stearns & Co., 592 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). gee gen-
erally Comment, Securities Fraud-Proof of Causation in 10b-5 Nondisclosure Cases In-
volving Trading on Impersonal Markets, 30 VAND. L. REv. 122, 125-26 (1976) (presumption
in nondisclosure cases that causation is shown is undisclosed information is material).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
1e 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1986); Robertson, 749 F.2d at 533.
'7 Robertson, 749 F.2d at 532. "A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for
two reasons: [I] lack of a cognizable legal theory, or [2] insufficient facts under a cognizable
legal claim." 2A J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 12.08 at 2271 (2d ed. 1982). Robert-
son exposed himself to dismissal on both grounds by asserting that Rule lOb-16 provides an
implied cause of action, and by failing to plead facts alleging scienter. See Robertson, 749
F.2d at 534. The district court did not indicate whether the dismissal was based on lack of a
private cause of action or the failure to plead scienter; to prevent an immediate successive
appeal by either party, therefore, the Ninth Circuit addressed both issues. Id.
10 See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534.
11 Id. at 534; see infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
20 See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534-36.
21 See id. at 536-39.
212 See id. at 534-35.
23 Id. at 535; see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 n.10 (1980);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
"' 749 F.2d at 536. Section 10(b) proscribes the "contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); see infra note 47 (§ 10(b) set forth).
Section 23(a) grants the SEC "power to make such rules and regulations as may be neces-
sary or appropriate to implement the provisions of this chapter. . .or for the execution of
the functions vested in [the SEC] by this chapter. . ... Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §
1986]
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that although a private remedy under section 10(b) is implied on
the basis of judicial construction rather than congressional intent,"
such remedy should be implied into rule 10b-16 because the rule is
reasonably related to the anti-fraud goals of section 10(b). 2
The Robertson court held that the pleadings of a plaintiff
could not be complete without an allegation of scienter Judge
Nelson declared that the rationale of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
28 in which the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who brought
private actions under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must allege sci-
enter, 29 "requires us to hold that pleading scienter is requisite to
maintaining an action brought pursuant to Rule 10b-16." While
the court recognized that requiring scienter in actions based on the
disclosure standards of Rule 10b-16 might undercut the effective-
ness of the margin disclosure regulation,"' it nonetheless main-
tained that the resolution of such inequalities was beyond judicial
power.1
Although the Ninth Circuit determined that an implied cause
of action is available to margin investors suffering losses as a result
23a, 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a)(1) (1982). The authority of the SEC to adopt rules and regulations
necessary for the execution of its functions has been interpreted as "broad." See Commer-
cial Capital Corp. v. SEC, 360 F.2d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 1966); see also Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 1960) (suggestion that SEC has broad author-
ity to regulate under section 10(b)), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 814 (1961).
21 See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 536. An implied right of action under section 10(b) was
first recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
By 1969, this implied cause of action, and specifically Rule 10b-5, had been recognized by
ten of the eleven courts of appeals. 6 L. Loss, SEcuRITrEs REGULATION 3871-73 (2d ed. 1961
& Supp. 1969). The Supreme Court continued the application of an implied cause of action
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without extended discussion. See Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). The Court has consistently reaf-
firmed this position as "well established." See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 196 (1976) (existence of private cause of action for violations of Rule well settled).
26 See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 539; Abeles v. Oppenheimer & Co., 597 F. Supp. 532, 536
(N.D. Ill. 1983). But see infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
27 See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 541.
28 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
29 Id. at 194-214. See generally Note, Scienter's Scope and Application in Rule 10b-5
Actions: An Analysis in Light of Hochfelder, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1977) (examining
import and suggesting appropriate treatment of scienter standard enunciated by Hochfelder
on private suits seeking damages or SEC injunctions).
"0 Robertson, 749 F.2d at 540.
31 See id.; Note, SEC Rule 10b-16 and the Regulation of Margin Credit, 87 YAL.E L.J.
372, 384-94 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Margin Credit]; Comment, SEC Rule 10b-16-Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit Limits Margin Call Disclosure By Broker-Dealers- Liang v.
Dean Witter & Co., 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1050, 1066-76 (1976).
32 See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 541.
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of inadequate disclosure of credit terms, the court's conclusion that
section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides the basis for an implied
remedy unduly limits the availability of such relief for injured in-
vestors. It is asserted that an analysis originating from section
10(b) of the Exchange Act mistakenly permits courts to infuse that
section's judicially created scienter requirement into an implied
10b-16 nondisclosure action. Such an infusion frustrates the con-
gressional mandate to ensure disclosure in securities margin trans-
actions. This Comment will suggest that the TILA, not section
10(b) of the Exchange Act, provides the congressional intent sup-
porting a private remedy under Rule 10b-16, and therefore the
plaintiff should not be required to alleged scienter.
APPROPRIATENESS OF SECTION 10(B) AS THE BASIS FOR SECURITIES
MARGIN NON-DISCLOSURE ACTIONS
The judicial standard for finding an implied cause of action3
within a federal statute was enunciated by a unanimous Supreme
Court in Cort v. Ash. 4 Restraining a previously expansive trend, 5
the Court articulated four factors relevant to determining whether
an implicit cause of action should exist.3 6 The Supreme Court has
'3 See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J., dis-
senting). A private cause of action has been defined as "the right of a private party to seek
judicial relief from injuries caused by another's violation of a legal requirement. Id. In the
context of legislation enacted by Congress, the legal requirement involved is a statutory
duty." Id.
. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, stockholders brought a derivative suit against the corpo-
rate directors of Bethlehem Steel Corp. and sought an implied right of action under section
610 of the Federal Elections Law, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. III 1973) (repealed 1976),
which prohibited corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection
with certain federal elections. Cart, 422 U.S. at 68-74. Holding that no implied remedy ex-
isted, id. at 68-69, the Supreme Court sought to delineate the appropriate standard for im-
plying a private cause of action. See id. at 78; Steinberg, Implied Private Right of Action
Under Federal Law, 12 SEc. L. REv. 433, 434 (1980); Note, Confusing Signals from the
Burger Court: Judicial Refinement of Private Causes of Action, 16 TULSA L.J. 91, 98 (1980).
" See Greene, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations: The
Separation of Powers Concerns, 16 TEmp. L.Q. 469, 478 (1981). For cases reflecting an ex-
pansive analysis, see, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1969) (§ 5 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204
(1967) (§ 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964) (§ 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
11 See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. The four factors are:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,"-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?.
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying
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recently applied an even more restrictive approach toward implied
causes of action 37 and has virtually relegated the Cort factors to
mere guidelines 8 used to reach the dispositive question of
"whether Congress intended to create [a] private right of action."3
The Robertson court utilized a two-step inquiry to ascertain
whether Congress intended to create an implied remedy for viola-
tions of Rule 10b-16.40 Enunciated by the District of Columbia Cir-
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?. And
finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. (citations omitted).
Although it is not necessary to satisfy all four Cort factors, see Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 388 (1982), it is submitted that the four
factors are met when Rule 10b-16 is violated. First, Rule 10b-16 was clearly created for the
"especial benefit" of persons, such as Robertson, who purchased securities on margin from
federally registered brokers. See SEC Release, supra note 14, at 19,717. Second, while ex-
plicit indicators of legislative intent do not negate an implied right of action, see H.R. REP.,
supra note 3; S. REP., supra note 3, implicit indicators strongly suggest a congressional in-
tent to create a private remedy. See Haynes v. Anderson & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp.
1303, 1320-21 (E.D. Va. 1981); infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. Third, implication
of a private right of action is consistent with the legislative scheme of the TILA. See 15
U.S.C. §§ 1635, 1640 (1982); cf. Haynes, 508 F. Supp. at 1319 ("the [TILA] and the Rule
should be read in harmony, if at all possible"). It is also consistent with the legislative
scheme of the federal securities acts to imply a private right of action. See, e.g., Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("[i]n addition to the private actions cre-
ated explicitly by the 1933 and 1934 Acts, federal courts have implied private remedies
under other provisions of the two laws."); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-35 (1964)
(private cause of action implied under § 14(a) of the 1934 Act); Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex,
Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1222-24 (4th Cir. 1980) (private cause of action implied under section
13(d) of the 1934 Act), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1981). Fourth, the TILA and the federal
securities acts were created by Congress to fill specific needs previously unmet by state regu-
lation, one of which was the disclosure of credit terms in connection with federal securities
transactions. See S. REP. supra note 3, at 1-3; H.R. REP. supra note 3, at 8-9, 13; Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1976).
" See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979); Cannon v. University
of Chicago, 411 U.S. 677, 698 (1979); Note, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal
Statutes: Congressional Intent, Judicial Deference, or Mutual Abdication?, 50 FORDHAM L.
REV. 611, 629 (1982); Comment, Implied Rights of Action In Federal Legislation: Harmoni-
zation with the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DuKE L.J. 928, 929-39.
38 Cf. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 302 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Four justices have agreed that "the so-called Cart factors are merely guides in the central
task of ascertaining legislative intent." Id.
"9 Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (emphasis added); see also
Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979) ("what must ulti-
mately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted");
Maher, Implied Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securities Laws: A Historical
Perspective, 37 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 783, 804-08 (1980) (discussing the effect of Touche
Ross and Transamerica on Cort).
40 Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. Because the rule was not enacted directly by Congress,
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cuit in Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co.,41 the bifurcated test requires
a court to determine "(1) whether Congress intended to delegate
authority to establish rules implying a private right of action;
[and] (2) whether the . . . rules were drafted such that a private
action may legitimately be implied. ' 42 It is submitted that the
components of the Jablon test were misstated and misapplied by
the Robertson court, thus rendering its reasoning and result
erroneous.
The Robertson court did not correctly state the first prong of
the Jablon test as "whether Congress intended to delegate author-
ity to establish [a rule] implying a private right of action,' 43 but
rather misstated the test as "whether Congress delegated authority
to establish [a rule] implying a private right of action."'44 Premising
the inquiry in this manner, the Robertson court confused the fun-
damental question of congressional intent to permit a private ac-
tion for violations of margin disclosure rules45 with the SEC's au-
thority to issue Rule 10b-16." Unquestionably, Congress intended
that the SEC promulgate rules to supplement section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act,47 but congressional intent to provide disclosure of
but by the SEC acting on authority delegated by Congress, the Robertson court used the
Jablon consideration. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. The existence of a
cause of action derived from a federal statute is a question of statutory construction. See
Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677, 688 (1979). Since Rule 10b-16 is not a statute but a rule promulgated pursuant to
a statute, a two-step analysis was necessary. See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 536.
41 614 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1980). The Jablon court considered whether a private
right of action could be implied from stock exchange rules enacted by an exchange acting on
a congressional delegation of authority. Id. See generally Note, Securities-Private Right of
Action Under Stock Exchange Rules-Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 1981 ARiz. ST. L.J. 337,
346-52 (discussing the Jablon Court's analysis).
42 Jablon, 614 F.2d at 679.
4" Id. (emphasis added).
11 Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534 (emphasis added).
11 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
46 See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 535.
,7 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or any facility of
any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a securities national exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id. (emphasis added).
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securities margin credit terms is not found within section 10(b).
Congress intended that a securities margin disclosure rule analo-
gous to the TILA regulations be enacted, 48 but allowed the SEC
discretion to choose an appropriate power base.49 After Congress
exempted securities margin disclosures from TILA,50 the SEC
chose section 10(b) and the general regulatory power under section
23(a) of the Exchange Act5 as the authority under which to issue
Rule 10b-16.5 '
Allowing congressional intent for an implied cause of action to
be derived from a power base selected by the SEC would permit
the intent of Congress to vacillate according to the choice made by
the SEC." Therefore, it is submitted that the Ninth Circuit im-
properly concluded that the congressional intent necessary to im-
ply a private cause of action is found in section 10(b) of the Ex-
change Act.
The Robertson court next considered the second prong of the
Jablon test,54 determining whether Rule 10b-16 "was drafted such
that [a] private action may legitimately be implied."5 5 Accepting
4" See S. REP. supra note 3, at 9; SEC Release supra note 14, at 19,717; Margin Credit,
supra note 33, at 391 n.71; Comment, supra note 31, at 1059-60; see also Haynes v. Ander-
son & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1320 (E.D. Va. 1981) (since Rule 10b-16 was
promulgated as the analogue of TILA, court should be guided by whether Congress created
a private right of action under TILA in determining whether a private right of action should
be implied under Rule 10b-16). But see Furer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. CCH 98,701 at 93, 495 (C.D.Cal. 1982); Abeles v.
Oppenheimer & Co., 597 F. Supp. 532, 536 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The Senate Report stated: "In
recommending an exemption for stockbroker margin loans in the [TILA], the Committee
intends for the SEC to require substantially similar disclosure by regulation as soon as it is
possible to issue such regulation." S. REP. supra note 3, at 9 (emphasis added).
"' See S. REP. supra note 3, at 9. The Senate Report stated that "[tihe committee has
been informed by the Securities and Exchange Commission that the Commission has ade-
quate regulatory authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to require adequate
disclosure of the costs of such credit." Id. The Senate Report also stated that the "SEC
already has the power to require margin disclosure under the 1933 Securities Act." Id. at 22.
Additionally, the House Report indicated that the SEC's authority to issue a margin disclos-
ure regulation was embodied in the 1933 Act, not section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. See HR
REP. supra note 3, at 28 ("the SEC is authorized to require disclosure as to (margin] trans-
actions under the Securities Act of 1933").
0' See Consumer Credit Protection Act § 104, 15 U.S.C. § 1603(2) (1982).
1 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1981).
52 See SEC Release, supra note 14, at 19,717.
'3 See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 535; supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text; infra
notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
"5 See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 679 (9th Cir. 1980); supra notes 41-
43 and accompanying text.
55 Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534.
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arguendo the court's determination that section 10(b) is the proper
source of the congressional intent for securities margin disclosure
rules with an implied private remedy,56 it is submitted that Rule
10b-16 was not drafted so that a cause of action under section
10(b) may legitimately be implied into it. Section 10(b) is a "catch-
all" anti-fraud statute designed to prohibit knowing and inten-
tional misconduct. 57 Rule 10b-16, however, is a mechanical disclos-
ure provision designed to protect and inform investors.5 8 The Rob-
ertson court affixed an anti-fraud statute cause of action to a
disclosure rule because it determined that fraud prevention and
disclosure were reasonably related goals. 9 Admittedly, the promo-
tion of disclosure helps prevent fraud,60 but it is suggested that the
Robertson court's action was illegitimate in a section 10(b) context.
The language used by Congress in section 10(b)6 necessitates a re-
50 Id. at 535.
17 Id. at 538 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980)). See
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1975); Siegel, The Interplay Between the
Implied Remedy Under Section 10(b) and the Express Causes of Action of the Federal
Securities Laws, 62 B.U.L. REv. 385, 385 (1982); Note, Establishment of Liability for Aiding
and Abetting Fraud Under Rule 10b-5 and the Common Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 862, 862
(1978); Comment, Section 10(b)-All That Is Unfair Is Not Fraud: Sante Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, 19 B.C.L. REV. 939, 949-51 (1978); supra note 47 (section 10(b) set forth in
pertinent part).
'8 SEC Release, supra note 14, at 19,717; see Robertson, 749 F.2d at 539; Liang v. Dean
Witter & Co., 540 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Steinberg v. Shearson Hayden Stone,
Inc., 546 F. Supp. 699, 700 (D. Del. 1982). The SEC Release stated:
The Rule requires an initial disclosure and periodic disclosures. The initial
disclosure is designed to insure that the investor, before his account is opened,
understands the terms and conditions under which credit charges will be made.
This will enable him to compare the various credit terms available to him and to
understand the methods used in computing the actual credit charges. The periodic
statement will inform the investor of the actual cost of credit and, with the aid of
the initial disclosure, enable him to accurately assess that cost.
SEC Release, supra note 14, at 19,717.
"' Robertson, 749 F.2d at 539. Having found § 10(b) to be the proper basis for implica-
tion of a private right of action, id. at 535, the Robertson court reasoned that it need only
review Rule lOb-16 to determine whether it was reasonably related to the purposes of its
enabling statute, also section 10(b). See id. at 537; see Mourning v. Family Pub. Serv. Inc.,
411 U.S. 356, 359 (1973); American Hosp. Management Corp. v. Harris, 638 F.2d 1208, 1212
(9th Cir. 1981).
11 See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); O'Brien v.
Continental Ill. Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 60 (7th Cir. 1979); Arber v. Essex
Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir. 1974); Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Re-
striction, 66 VA. L. REV. 1, 62-63 (1980); Comment, supra note 57, at 949-58.
a' 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). Section 10(b) states in pertinent part that: "It shall be
unlawful ... to use or employ ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance";
see also supra note 47 (§10(b) in greater detail).
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quirement of scienter for an implied section 10(b) action.62  How-
ever, this strong anti-fraud language is manifestly absent from
Rule 10b-16,6 3 suggesting that Rule 10b-16 was not narrowly
designed to thwart only manipulative and fraudulent conduct, but
was broad in scope so as to encompass conduct that unintention-
ally causes harm.6 4 Allowing an antifraud provision to act as the
touchstone for a nondisclosure action illogically encumbers the
remedy with a scienter burden, thereby frustrating the congres-
sional purpose behind the margin disclosure provision. 5
THE TILA AS THE PROPER SOURCE OF CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The TILA gives consumers an express right of action for non-
disclosure of credit terms.6 Since Congress intended the securities
margin disclosure rules to be "substantially similar" to the TILA
disclosure provisions,6 7 it is suggested that the congressional intent
behind the TILA should be utilized to imply a private cause of
action for violations of Rule 10b-16.68 This would demonstrate that
Congress intended to delegate authority to the SEC to establish a
securities margin disclosure rule implying a private right of action,
69 and that a disclosure rule like Rule 10b-16 could be drafted such
that a private cause of action could legitimately be implied from
the TILA.70
82 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1976). The Court stated: "The
words 'manipulative or deceptive' used in conjunction with 'device or contrivance' strongly
suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct." Id. at
197.
8s See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-16 (1985); supra note 2 (Rule 10b-16 set forth in pertinent
part).
See Steinberg v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 699, 700-01 (D. Del.
1982); infra notes 67-69.
" See Margin Credit, supra note 31, at 376, 387, 390 n.66; Comment, supra note 31 at
1079.
86 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
87 See S. REP., supra note 3, at 9; supra note 48 and accompanying text.
88 See Liang v. Dean Witter & Co., 540 F.2d 1107, 1110-13 & 1113 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 270, 274 (D.N.J. 1983); Steinberg v.
Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 699, 701 n.4 (D. Del. 1982). But see Slomiak v.
Bear Stearns & Co., 597 F. Supp. 676, 678-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Abeles v. Oppenheimer &
Co., 597 F. Supp. 532, 535-36 (N.D. Ill. 1983); Furer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 11 98,701 at 93,495 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
'9 See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
70 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT
Relying on the Exchange Act and the Hochfelder decision, the
Robertson court erroneously required scienter as a necessary ele-
ment of an implied cause of action under Rule 10b-16.71 While
Rule 10b-5 shares the anti-fraud language and legislative history of
section 10(b), and thus warrants a scienter requirement, Rule 10b-
16 shares neither the language nor the legislative history of section
10(b).7 2 Moreover, the concerns that prompted the Hochfelder
71 See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 539-41. Drawing from Hochfelder, the Robertson court
based its Rule 10b-16 scienter requirement on the structure of the Securities Act of 1933
and the Exchange Act of 1934, noting that in each instance in which Congress had expressly
created a civil remedy, it also specified the standard of liability. Id. at 540. See Hochfelder,
425 U.S. at 208-10. Therefore, the Robertson court reasoned, applying section 10(b) to
merely negligent conduct ignores the fact that "when Congress intended to accomplish that
result, it did so expressly, and subjected these actions to procedural restrictions not found
under section 10(b)." See Robertson, 749 F.2d at 540; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 206-11. How-
ever, when Congress intended a scienter standard under the securities laws, it also specifi-
cally provided for such. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 207-08. Therefore, this specificity-of-
standards argument becomes a two-edged sword that can be used to preclude a scienter
standard, as well as a negligence standard, for an implied cause of action under section
10(b). See Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define Scienter Under Rule lob-5:
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. Rv. 213, 225 (1977). Because Congress did not
provide an express remedy in section 10(b), the procedural context of the remedies it did
expressly consider gives little insight into the extent of the section 10(b) duty. See Com-
ment, Securities Law-Private Cause of Action for Damages Under Rule 10b-5 Requires
Scienter-Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 25 EMORY L.J. 465, 467-68 (1976).
72 Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985) with 15 U.S.C. §78j(b) (1982). Rule 10b-5
states in pertinent part:
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful...
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985) (emphasis added). See supra note 47 (section 10(b) set forth in
pertinent part). While there is a "dearth of evidence" in legislative history concerning the
congressional intent behind section 10(b), see 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrnas LAW: FRAUD-SEC
RULE 1Oa-5, § 2.2 (331) at 22.2 (1975), the pertinent legislative history that exists demon-
strates a commonality between section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at
201-06; S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Seas. 7-9 (1934); HR. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 10-11, 20-21 (1934); HRR CONF. R P. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934); Hear-
ings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 2d Seas. 115 (1934); see also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May
21, 1942) (Rule 10b-5 expanded to include all individuals and companies within anti-fraud
rules that theretofore applied only to brokers and dealers). See generally Berner & Frank-
lin, Scienter and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 Injunctive Actions: A
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court to impose a scienter requirement under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5-that unless the scope of section 10(b) was limited to
knowing or intentional misconduct, actions for negligence could be
brought under section 10(b) rather than under the more limited
express remedy provisions of the securities acts, undermining the
overall effectiveness -of the securities laws73 -are not present in a
Rule 10b-16 situation. Because Rule 10b-16 is purely a "mechani-
cal rule" that "sets forth objectives and specific disclosure require-
ments for credit terms in margin transactions, '74 it is submitted
that no interference with the comprehensive enforcement scheme
of the securities acts will arise if scienter is not imposed under
Rule 10b-16. Finally, when Rule 10b-16 was promulgated, there
was no scienter requirement in actions brought under section
10(b). 5 Therefore, it cannot be argued that Congress or the SEC
intended to make scienter a requirement in actions under Rule
lob-16.
CONCLUSION
The availability of an implied cause of action for a violation of
Rule 10b-16 insures complete disclosure in margin securities trans-
actions and fosters informed investment. While the essential ques-
tion is whether Congress intended that the courts create a private
remedy, the Robertson court mistakenly found the requisite con-
gressional intent in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. However, by
deriving the intent of Congress from the TILA, as this Comment
has suggested, the obtrusive requirement of scienter would be
eliminated and the underlying purpose of Rule 10b-16 would be
more effectively promoted.
Thomas G. Seaman
Reappraisal in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 769, 777 (1976) (language and history
of Rule 10b-5 strongly support scienter conclusion).
" See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 208-11; Note, The Scienter Requirement in SEC Injunc-
tive Enforcement of Section 10(b) After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REv.
419, 422-24 (1977); 969 (1976); Note, Civil Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5-The Scienter Requirement, 51 TuL. L. REV. 177, 182-83 (1976); Comment, Scienter Is
Required in a Private Action Under Rule 10b-5- Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 25 DE PAUL
L. REV. 962, 969 (1976).
7 Steinberg v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 699, 700 (D. Del. 1982).
7' See SEC Release, supra note 14, at 19,717. Rule 10b-16 was promulgated on Decem-
ber 16, 1969. Id. The Supreme Court determined that scienter is a necessary element of a
section 10(b) action in 1976. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 (1976).
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